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Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability:  
Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of  
the Clean Water Act 
Robert W. Adler  
INTRODUCTION  
Some think it unwise to revisit a place embedded with fond 
memories, for it is never quite the same, either because the place 
itself has changed, or because your memories have been filtered 
through the years. I prefer to think of it as a mixed blessing. The fond 
memories are refreshed, but something is always missing or 
significantly changed. Likewise, there is both utility and peril in 
revisiting bedrock principles held dear throughout a career of 
understandings and expectations. Thus, it is with some trepidation 
that I revisit the fundamental principles of the Clean Water Act 
(―CWA‖),1 a statute on which I have worked off and on for some 
thirty years. Then again, as John Lilly wrote: ―Our only security is 
our ability to change.‖2 
After engaging in what I hope is an objective analysis of those 
basic concepts, I reached conclusions that are, not surprisingly, mixed 
and that largely agree with those reflected in Professor Glicksman 
and Mr. Batzel‘s companion article.3 Many of the basic ideas in the 
 
  James I. Farr Chair and Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of 
Law; J.D. (1980), Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. (1977), Johns Hopkins University. 
I want to thank Professors Mandelker and Tarlock and the student editors for inviting me to 
participate in this symposium, and for organizing such a stimulating exchange of ideas. 
 1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).  
 2. RICHARD KEHL, BREATHING ON YOUR OWN, QUOTATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT 
THINKERS 24 (2001).  
 3. Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the 
Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 
32 WASH. U. J.L. POL‘Y 99 (2010). 
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CWA remain as sound today as they were when enacted in 1972.
4
 For 
example, in section 301(a) of the Act, Congress reversed the prior 
presumption that discharges of pollutants into surface waters were 
permissible absent a showing of harm and changed the law to flatly 
prohibit all pollutant discharges absent valid permits and compliance 
with treatment requirements and other conditions.
5
 The underlying 
goal of the statute for such sources is zero discharge of pollutants into 
the waters of the United States.
6
 Along the same lines, Congress 
replaced the existing water quality-driven pollution control strategy 
with a requirement that all point source dischargers implement 
minimum technology-based standards, with water quality-based 
limitations as a backup to ensure attainment of water quality 
standards in individual water bodies
7
 wherever attainable by 1983.
8
 
Third, although there had been significant precedent for whole 
watershed planning in earlier federal laws such as the Water 
Resources Planning Act of 1965,
9
 the 1972 CWA amendments 
sought to expand the focus of analysis from the effects of individual 
dischargers on discrete water segments to one in which states must 
consider the comprehensive effects of point source discharges and 
other sources of pollution—including land disturbance and other 
polluted runoff—on a watershed basis.10 
The fact that these bedrock principles of the 1972 Act remain 
sound, of course, does not mean that all of those concepts have been 
implemented fully and adequately. To name just a few important 
 
 4. By the ―Clean Water Act,‖ for purposes of this analysis, I am referring to the major 
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act adopted by Congress in 1972. Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)). Future references to the Act will be to section 
numbers of the statute in the text, and to the U.S.C. sections in footnotes, except as otherwise 
noted.  
 5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).  
 6. See id. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1311(b)(2)(A), 1316(a)(1). Glicksman and Batzel correctly 
question whether everyone in Congress viewed this as a realistic as opposed to an aspirational 
or politically motivated goal. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 3, at 106. 
 7. See id. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b).  
 8. See id. § 1251(a)(2). 
 9. Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79 Stat. 244 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (1965)). 
 10. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1258 (2006). In the 1987 amendments, Congress adopted a more 
specific set of requirements for states to develop watershed-based plans and controls on 
nonpoint source pollution. See id. § 1319.  
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examples, not all point source discharges have been controlled 
properly;
11
 enforcement is difficult and limited by resources and 
sometimes politics;
12
 pollution from nonpoint sources remains 
significant, and in many cases, subject to weak or even nonexistent 
controls;
13
 a large percentage of water bodies around the country 
continue to violate ambient water quality standards;
14
 implementation 
has focused on chemical pollution to the detriment of other 
significant kinds of aquatic ecosystem impairment;
15
 and permits for 
discharges of dredge-and-fill material into wetlands and other similar 
waters are dispensed so frequently that many of those waters have 
simply been eliminated entirely.
16
  
However, in other respects and in some cases because of the 
significant implementation failures or gaps just mentioned, some of 
the major underpinnings of the CWA merit reconsideration given 
changes in science and society. Any attempt at such a sweeping 
analysis of a statute that spans hundreds of pages of text would 
necessarily be incomplete, especially in a relatively short symposium 
essay. Therefore, rather than even attempting a comprehensive 
review, I am taking a thematic approach based on the guiding 
principles Congress articulated in the law‘s opening provision: ―The 
objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation‘s waters.‖17  
From this overarching statement of the statutory goals, I will 
critique four major concepts. First, the concept of ―integrity‖ was 
adopted and has been interpreted based on ecological concepts that 
have evolved considerably over time; today, there is greater 
 
 11. See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a 
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 543 (2004).  
 12. See id. at 543–44 & nn.31 & 38; Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water 
Act in the Twenty-First Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. 
REV. 775, 776 (2004). 
 13. See Andreen, supra note 11, at 543–45; David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source 
Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 528 (1996). 
 14. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Assessment Database, 
http://www.epa.gov/waters/305b/index_2004.html (last visited May 23, 2010). 
 15. See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive 
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29 (2003).  
 16. See id. at 69; Andreen, supra note 11, at 545–46.  
 17. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  
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recognition of the understanding that healthy ecosystems are 
evolutionary rather than static. In Part I, I address the need to move 
from a focus on ecological stability or equilibrium to an emphasis on 
ecological health and resilience of the nation‘s waters. Second, 
although the text says ―restore and maintain,‖ the concept of 
restoration is unfortunately narrow in practice, in part due to 
limitations in the operative provisions of the law itself and in part due 
to the historically narrow focus of statutory implementation. In Part 
II, I propose a relative shift in focus from maintenance to restoration. 
Third, although Congress clearly recognized in 1972 that runoff from 
agriculture and other intensive land use contributes as significantly to 
water pollution as do discharges from municipal and industrial point 
sources, the operative provisions of the law were written—and 
certainly have been implemented—mainly with the latter in mind. In 
Part III, I suggest a shift in focus appropriate to the transition from an 
industrial to a post-industrial age. Finally, although Congress 
expressed a clear intent in 1972 to expand the scope of federal water 
pollution control efforts to the full extent permissible under the 
Constitution, its definition of the ―waters of the United States‖ 
retained a reference to navigation, which the Supreme Court has 
interpreted as limiting the scope of the statute in some significant 
respects. In Part IV, I support efforts to expand the jurisdictional 
focus of the Act from navigable waters to sustainable waters, to better 
match the breadth of Congress‘s constitutional authority, and to better 
fulfill the statutory focus on watershed and ecosystem health.  
I. REINTERPRETING THE INTEGRITY GOAL: FROM STABILITY TO 
RESILIENCE 
As noted above, the overriding objective of the CWA is to 
―restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation‘s waters.‖18 What, however, did Congress in 1972 mean 
by ―integrity‖? That term is not defined directly in the statute, but the 
legislative history of the 1972 amendments indicates that the 
committees sponsoring the legislation gave the term serious 
consideration. They considered the meaning of that term based on 
 
 18. Id. (emphasis added).  
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prevailing ecological concepts of stability and equilibrium, 
suggesting a return to a pristine, optimum ecological state or 
condition. Thus, the 1972 Senate Report explained:  
Maintenance of such integrity requires that any changes in the 
environment resulting in a physical, chemical or biological 
change in a pristine water body be of a temporary nature, such 
that by natural processes, within a few hours, days or weeks, 
the aquatic ecosystem will return to a state functionally 
identical to the original.  
 In those water bodies which are not pristine, it should be 
the national policy to take those steps which will result in 
change towards that pristine state in which the physical, 
chemical and biological integrity of the water body can be said 
to exist. Striving towards and maintaining the pristine state is 
an objective which minimizes the burden to man in 
maintaining a healthy environment, and which will provide for 
a stable biosphere that is essential to the well-being of human 
society.
19
  
Similarly, the 1972 House Report defined the term ―integrity‖ as:  
a concept that refers to a condition in which the natural 
structure and function of ecosystems is maintained. . . .  
 . . . . 
 Although man is a ―part of nature‖ and a product of 
evolution, ―natural‖ is generally defined as that condition in 
existence before the activities of man invoked perturbations 
which prevented the system from returning to its original state 
of equilibrium.  
 . . . . 
 
 19. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742 (emphasis 
added).  
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 Any change induced by man which overtaxes the ability of 
nature to restore conditions to ―natural‖ or ―original‖ is an 
unacceptable perturbation.
20
 
 Notably, these explanations reflected a somewhat sophisticated 
understanding that ecosystems are healthy—or possess ―integrity‖—
based on their function as well as their structure. At the same time, 
however, and as Professor Glicksman and Mr. Batzel also note,
21
 the 
committee reports reflect a belief that the path to ecological integrity 
lay in the return to an optimum biological state or equilibrium 
condition that existed prior to human disturbance of aquatic 
ecosystems, and that any deviation from that pristine condition is 
presumptively bad and must be reversed. That concept is reflected 
operationally in the nature of most of the individual criteria that have 
dominated implementation of the Act‘s water quality standards 
program and that serve as the primary measure against which the 
law‘s system of technology-based controls are assessed. Those 
criteria consist mainly of individual component indicators and are 
articulated primarily in terms of maximum (or in some cases, 
minimum) levels of particular contaminants or other chemical or 
physical characteristics deemed sufficient to protect biological 
integrity and other beneficial uses of water and water bodies.
22
 Along 
with development, implementation, and enforcement of the Act‘s 
complex and comprehensive system of technology-based effluent 
limitations for municipal and industrial point sources, adoption, 
monitoring, and implementation of these discrete water quality 
standards have been the dominant foci of activity under the law. 
These foci suggested that ecosystem integrity depends on attainment 
of some optimal level of a composite of individual parameters, rather 
than a more holistic measure of overall ecosystem health.  
Through the lens of nearly four decades of experience and 
developments in the science of ecology, these ideas can be critiqued 
on at least two major grounds. First, the scientific paradigm for 
 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76–77 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 21. See generally Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 3.  
 22. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 
HANDBOOK, app. I (2d ed. 1994), http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/handbook/ 
handbookappxI.pdf.  
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ecosystem integrity has shifted from the idea of ―stability‖ to a 
concept of dynamic change and resilience, the significance of which 
other commentators have discussed in other environmental law 
contexts.
23
 Recognizing that ecosystems as well as individual species 
have evolved considerably over time, ecologists no longer suggest 
that there is some single, optimal state to which ecosystems should be 
―restored and maintained.‖ Rather, they increasingly define integrity 
in terms of successful ―community functioning,‖ ―the capacity to 
withstand stress‖ (or ―resilience‖ to perturbations), optimal capacity 
for a wide range of development options, and maximum ability to 
change and develop in the face of changing environmental and 
biological conditions.
24
  
This evolving concept of ecological integrity clearly has not been 
ignored in the development of a national water quality program, from 
either a scientific or a legal/regulatory perspective. Just a decade after 
the 1972 CWA, Dr. James Karr and others began to develop 
multivariate indices of aquatic ecosystem health designed to assess 
the overall health or integrity of aquatic ecosystems more holistically, 
i.e., as indicators of the system‘s capacity to evolve and to retain its 
ecological functions over time.
25
 Based on a robust set of ecological 
parameters and likened to the index of economic indicators used to 
gauge the health of the national economy as a whole,
26
 those indices 
are now the basis for biological water quality criteria (often referred 
to as ―biocriteria‖) adopted by many states with strong 
 
 23. See, e.g., Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium 
View of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 871 (2006); 
Timothy H. Profeta, Note, Managing without a Balance: Environmental Regulation in Light of 
Ecological Advances, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y F. 71 (1996); A. Dan Tarlock, The 
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (1994).  
 24. See Robert E. Ulanowicz, Toward the Measurement of Ecological Integrity, in 
ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY: INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT, CONSERVATION, AND HEALTH 99, 99 
(David Pimentel, Laura Westra & Reed F. Noss eds., 2000) [hereinafter ECOLOGICAL 
INTEGRITY].  
 25. See James R. Karr, Assessment of Biotic Integrity Using Fish Communities, 6 
FISHERIES 21 passim (1981); James R. Karr & Daniel R. Dudley, Ecological Perspective on 
Water Quality Goals, 5 ENVTL. MGMT. 55 passim (1981).  
 26. See James R. Karr, Health, Integrity, and Biological Assessment: The Importance of 
Measuring Whole Things, in ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, supra note 24, at 209, 221.  
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encouragement from EPA.
27
 Moreover, for purposes of assessing the 
status and health of U.S. aquatic ecosystems nationally, EPA has 
embarked on widespread efforts to measure ecological integrity 
through multivariate indices and field monitoring protocols that look 
to direct indicators of ecosystem health rather than numeric indicators 
of discrete pollutants.
28
 However, it would be a stretch to suggest that 
those assessment methods and criteria do more than augment the 
numeric water quality criteria for individual chemical and physical 
characteristics that continue to dominate the CWA program.  
The second ground on which the original notion of ecosystem 
integrity can be critiqued concerns practical considerations involving 
human beings‘ activities in the environment. The more sophisticated 
tools for monitoring and assessing aquatic ecosystem health rely on 
comparisons of ecological indicators relative to conditions expected 
of similar systems absent any anthropogenic changes or stressors 
(known as ―reference systems‖), and therefore are based on the 
fundamental premise that ecological integrity varies from optimal 
integrity in proportion to the degree of human-induced changes to the 
system.
29
 This idea means that the idealized notion reflected in the 
1972 legislative history that all U.S. waters can be returned to their 
full state of ―chemical, physical, and biological integrity,‖ although 
noble in aspiration, is unrealistic absent a wholesale retreat from a 
modern industrial economy and society. With enough money and 
work, we may be able to attain water quality levels defined by most 
or all individual water quality criteria in most or all of our waters by 
continuing to reduce or eliminate pollutant discharges. However, 
given this revised notion of ―integrity,‖ it is unreasonable to assume 
attainment of that objective in any but the most highly protected 
waters and surrounding lands, such as national parks.
30
  
 
 27. See generally JAMES R. KARR & ELLEN W. CHU, RESTORING LIFE IN RUNNING 
WATERS: BETTER BIOLOGICAL MONITORING (1999); Adler, supra note 15, at 70–75; Robert W. 
Adler, Filling the Gaps in Water Quality Standards: Legal Perspectives on Biocriteria, in 
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND CRITERIA: TOOLS FOR WATER RESOURCE PLANNING AND 
DECISION MAKING 345 (Wayne S. Davis & Thomas P. Simon eds., 1995). 
 28. See, e.g., OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WADEABLE STREAMS 
ASSESSMENT: A COLLABORATIVE SURVEY OF THE NATION‘S STREAMS (2006). 
 29. See Karr, supra note 26, at 212–13. 
 30. See id. at 214.  
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Moreover, the use of idealized reference conditions as a 
benchmark against which to measure ecosystem integrity begs the 
question of how much deviation from that reference condition should 
be deemed ―acceptable‖ for any given portion of our aquatic 
ecosystems, given that human disturbance of those systems varies 
dramatically from intensely developed urban areas to relatively 
pristine wilderness. Those issues necessarily involve some degree of 
value judgment as opposed to purely scientific assessment.
31
 
Although the same is true to some degree for water quality criteria 
based on numeric water quality parameters, especially for non-
threshold pollutants,
32
 risk assessment methodologies are used to 
draw those lines, however controversial those methods may be.
33
 By 
contrast, we continue to grapple with the problem of how to reach 
societal—as opposed to scientific—judgments about what level of 
deviation from entirely unimpaired ecosystems is the appropriate 
target for restoration. These judgments do not lie in the realm of pure 
science, but they instead involve questions that cannot be answered 
by science alone, questions that nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg 
termed ―trans-scientific.‖34  
What significance does this shift in ecological philosophy suggest 
for the CWA? It would go much too far to suggest that broad-based 
indicators of ecological integrity should replace water quality criteria 
for individual pollutants. First, many of those criteria are adopted to 
protect against serious human health impacts caused by human 
exposure to contaminated drinking water, recreational waters, and 
 
 31. See Alan Holland, Ecological Integrity and the Darwinian Paradigm, in ECOLOGICAL 
INTEGRITY, supra note 24, at 45, 46 (discussing ―integrity‖ as a normative concept); R. Bruce 
Hull & David P. Robertson, The Language of Nature Matters: We Need a More Public 
Ecology, in RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 
97, 107–09 (Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000).  
 32. A non-threshold pollutant is one for which some degree of harm occurs even at the 
lowest levels of contamination, making it necessary to reach a value judgment about an 
―acceptable‖ level of risk for any pollutant concentration above zero. See Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) 
(discussing nature of vinyl chloride as non-threshold pollutant).  
 33. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk 
Assessment in Environmental Decision-making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1643–47 (1995); Mark 
Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 409, 411 (1995).  
 34. See Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).  
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fish and wildlife.
35
 Although pollution of water bodies with 
chemicals or pathogens sufficient to generate those human health 
risks might impair the integrity of the aquatic ecosystem as well, it is 
possible that a system could be healthy in general, i.e., have sufficient 
resilience due to other attributes of ecological health to withstand 
some levels of pollution, but still contain discrete pollutants at levels 
that pose human health risks. The CWA and applicable EPA 
regulations require states to adopt and enforce both water quality 
standards sufficient to protect all existing and designated uses, and 
the specific criterion necessary to protect the most sensitive use for 
any given pollutant.
36
 Second, numeric criteria provide the kind of 
certainty that lawyers prefer for purposes of enforceability and 
accountability. Numeric criteria can be written into specific, 
enforceable water quality-based effluent limitations in ways that 
simply are not possible for criteria derived from multivariate indices 
of ecological factors such as species richness or trophic community 
structure.
37
  
For purposes of achieving the statutory goal of aquatic ecosystem 
integrity as opposed to protection of human health, however, it would 
seem that individual numeric water quality criteria are, at best, 
necessary but not sufficient to attain aquatic ecosystem health. 
Indeed, Congress appears to have recognized this reality by clearly 
distinguishing between water quality criteria that focus on the 
―presence,‖ ―concentration and dispersal,‖ and ―effects‖ of 
―pollutants‖ in water bodies, and on other ―factors necessary to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity‖ 
of waters.
38
 Clearly, Congress envisioned that water quality standards 
would address factors other than concentrations of individual 
pollutants.  
This potential for focus on other factors has several important 
implications for implementation or modification of the CWA. 
Although it might seem heretical to old regulatory and enforcement 
 
 35. See Environmental Protection Agency, Revisions to the Methodology for Deriving 
Ambient Water Quality Criteria for the Protection of Human Health (2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 
66,443, 66,445 (Nov. 3, 2000).  
 36. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(a) (2009).  
 37. See Adler, supra note 15, at 73–75; Adler, supra note 27. 
 38. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2006), with id. § 1314(a)(2).  
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attorneys (like me), individual criteria based on generic science rather 
than the needs of specific water bodies might not necessarily be 
considered inviolate. In other words, a water body might violate 
individual water quality parameters and still be ―healthy‖ or 
demonstrate ecological ―integrity‖ based on broader indicators of 
ecosystem health. In fact, under the evolving concept of ecological 
resilience, the goal of environmental protection is not necessarily to 
restore an ecosystem to some fixed state defined by a suite of specific 
numeric or other parameters, but to ensure that the system has 
sufficient capacity to respond to environmental perturbations or 
disturbances while still retaining its basic ecological structure and 
functions.
39
 As such, those very attributes of resilience may provide a 
system with sufficient capacity to deal with some increases in 
pollutant concentrations beyond that defined by discrete water quality 
criteria. A truly healthy system may be able to withstand more 
―pollution‖ than defined by the individual standards. I do not make 
that assertion lightly, and in a perfect world we might insist on 
attainment both of all discrete water quality criteria and of broader 
measures designed to define and measure ecological health. In a 
world of limited resources, however, it is possible that we have been 
exalting the former at the expense of the latter. Of course, the 
opposite may also be true in some cases. A system that is stressed by 
too much pollution may be so disturbed that it cannot be restored to 
natural structure and function.
40
 
Still, this evolving scientific understanding of the conditions 
necessary to ensure ecological integrity suggests that our virtually 
exclusive implementation focus on the discharge of chemical 
pollutants has been at the expense of efforts to redress other forms of 
pollution.
41
 It has been clear for some time—particularly after we 
succeeded in eliminating or significantly reducing discharges of 
dramatic amounts of chemical and biological pollutants—that the 
 
 39. See BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING 
ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 1 (2006). 
 40. See Holly L. Menninger & Margaret A. Palmer, Restoring Ecological Communities: 
From Theory to Practice, in FOUNDATIONS OF RESTORATION ECOLOGY 88, 95–96 (Donald A. 
Falk, Margaret A. Palmer & Joy B. Zedler eds., 2006).  
 41. See Donald Brown et al., Implementing Global Ecological Integrity: A Synthesis, in 
ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, supra note 24, at 385, 385.  
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health of aquatic ecosystems is impaired far more dramatically by 
habitat losses and degradation from a much wider range of human 
activities, such as dams, channelization, dredging, levees, 
hydrological modification of watersheds, and introduction of invasive 
species, than by chemical pollution alone.
42
 Thus, we have made far 
more progress in reducing chemical pollution than we have in 
restoring the physical and biological integrity of the nation‘s waters.43  
There are several possible reasons for this relatively narrow focus 
to date. First, we have spent most of our time and money on 
increasingly stringent point source controls, at the expense of efforts 
to address other sources of ecosystem harm.
44
 Spending limited 
resources tilting at the zero discharge windmill
45
 while ignoring so 
many other sources of impairment may not reflect the best use of 
society‘s resources, even though a change in practice in this area 
would challenge a sacrosanct principle of the CWA.
46
 Second, we 
have shied away from efforts to deal with other forms of impairment 
because it is so difficult to reverse so many past actions and activities 
that adversely affect aquatic ecosystem health, especially where 
doing so would conflict with private property rights and development 
―at the water‘s edge.‖47  
Most clearly, however, we have not redressed the most significant 
reasons for the loss of aquatic ecosystem integrity because there is a 
mismatch between the breadth of the underlying objective of the 
CWA and the scope of its operative provisions. In the following two 
Parts, I propose distinct but related ways to correct that mismatch.  
 
 42. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 62, 65, 78; 
ROBERT A. ABELL ET AL., FRESHWATER ECOREGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA, A CONSERVATION 
ASSESSMENT 1, 17–20, 62–70 (2000).  
 43. See generally Adler, supra note 15.  
 44. See ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 14–16 (1993).  
 45. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2006).  
 46. To be clear, I do not advocate a retreat from the concept of technology-based controls 
in favor of a return to a purely water quality-based approach. The zero discharge requirement, 
however, is not necessary to the basic concept of requiring adoption of the best technology 
available to control pollutant discharges from individual sources. 
 47. See Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water’s Edge: Limits to ―Ownership‖ of 
Aquatic Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 201, 201–
02 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 2005) [hereinafter WET GROWTH].  
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II. EXPANDING THE TOOLS: FROM MAINTENANCE TO RESTORATION  
To some degree, even the most basic operative provision of the 
CWA is designed to achieve restoration as well as maintenance of the 
nation‘s waters. Section 301(a) of the Act flatly prohibits the 
discharge of any pollutant into the waters of the United States 
without a valid permit and compliance with treatment requirements 
designed to ensure attainment of water quality standards and 
implementation of ―best technology‖ mandates intended to approach 
or achieve zero discharge of pollutants.
48
 Clearly, progress in 
reducing the massive amounts of pollutants that were routinely 
spewed into our rivers and other waters before 1972 was an essential 
first step to restore the integrity of those waters. Equally clearly, 
however, reduction of pollutants alone is not sufficient to meet the 
broader objectives of the law.  
Once point source pollutant discharges into a water body are 
reduced significantly, most of the operative, enforceable provisions 
of the law and its implementing regulations then shift from 
restoration to maintenance, regardless of whether the ecological 
integrity of the water body has actually been restored. By contrast, 
nothing in the law mandates steps to reduce or eliminate other 
sources of water body impairment, although some provisions of the 
law at least authorize or encourage such measures.  
The current CWA focus on maintenance is reflected most clearly 
in the water quality standards provisions. Technology-based 
treatment requirements were most responsible for restoring chemical 
integrity to many water bodies. Once ambient water quality standards 
are met for discrete water quality parameters, the anti-degradation 
component of the water quality standards program then kicks in to 
ensure that additional or increased discharges are not allowed in ways 
that would either degrade existing levels of water quality, or to impair 
or eliminate existing water body uses.
49
  
However, two related attributes of the water quality standards 
provisions limit the degree to which the statute—at least as currently 
implemented—can focus on affirmative restoration of aquatic 
 
 48. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
 49. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2009).  
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ecosystems impaired by factors other than pollutant discharges. First, 
although the development of biocriteria and other more ecologically 
sophisticated forms of water quality criteria and monitoring methods 
has helped EPA and states identify the degree of impairment of water 
bodies based on a broader range of ecological indicators, the 
mechanism by which those indicia of impairment can be translated 
into enforceable corrective measures is anything but clear.
50
 Permit-
writers can impose stricter water quality-based effluent limitations on 
point sources where numeric water quality criteria for specific 
pollutants are exceeded.
51
 However, if biological monitoring suggests 
that a water body is ecologically impaired, and the causes are likely 
to be any of a range of habitat impairments, such as flow reductions, 
channelization, loss of riparian wetlands, or floodplain habitat, etc., 
there is no equally direct mechanism to require corrective measures. 
Likewise, the total maximum daily load (―TMDL‖) provision of the 
CWA,
52
 designed to provide a mechanism for states or EPA to 
redress water quality standards violations, provides no clear 
mechanism for imposing requirements other than numeric water 
quality-based effluent limits for point sources,
53
 and the nomenclature 
itself (maximum daily loads) suggests the focus on discharges of 
pollutants rather than other sources of water body impairment.  
The CWA does include several more comprehensive planning 
provisions that can, at least in theory, be used as tools to promote 
efforts tailored specifically to restoration of more holistic ecological 
 
 50. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the 
Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 221–23 (1999).  
 51. See 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(1)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2009).  
 52. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).  
 53. Section 303(d) requires states to identify all waters for which the first round of 
technology-based limitations were insufficient to ―implement any water quality standard 
applicable to such waters.‖ Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A). In principle, that could include biocriteria or 
other standards violated for reasons other than chemical pollutants. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C). 
However, the operative corrective provision only mandates that the state develop and 
implement the ―maximum daily load‖ for ―pollutants.‖ Although those load calculations may 
include both point and nonpoint sources of those pollutants, see Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 
1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002), they do not include other forms of water body impairment, although 
the potential utility of the TMDL process in addressing other sources of impairment was the 
subject of intensive debate by the Federal Advisory Committee on TMDLs and in subsequent 
debates over the scope of EPA‘s TMDL regulation. See generally OFFICE OF THE ADM‘R, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT OF THE FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM 
DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM (1998). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of the CWA 153 
 
 
integrity. Section 208, adopted as part of the 1972 Act, provides both 
for area-wide waste treatment and management programs and for 
plans to address various nonpoint sources of pollution.
54
 If 
―pollution‖ were viewed with the full breadth suggested by the 
statutory definition of that term,
55
 this planning process could have 
been used to initiate broader restoration programs. However, most of 
the specific language in section 208 refers to runoff of pollutants 
from sources such as agriculture, silviculture, mining, and 
construction activities,
56
 and the provision has largely been 
understood as being focused on those kinds of nonpoint source 
pollution.
57
  
The more specific nonpoint source pollution planning provision 
Congress added in 1987 (section 319 of the Act) continues this latent 
ambiguity about the breadth of controls on nonpoint source pollution. 
State assessment reports required under section 319(a) must identify 
―nonpoint sources of pollution‖ (not ―pollutants‖), which, absent 
adequate controls, are not sufficient to ―attain or maintain applicable 
water quality standards or the goals and requirements of this 
chapter.‖58 If we interpret the reference to all water quality standards 
seriously, section 319 assessments must address violations of 
narrative criteria, biocriteria, and other forms of standards designed 
to measure and reflect ecological integrity as well as chemical 
pollutants. Moreover, the additional reference to the ―goals and 
requirements of this chapter‖59 must include not only the Act‘s 
subsidiary goals such as zero discharge of chemical pollutants
60
 and 
attainment of water quality levels necessary to protect fishable and 
 
 54. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2006).  
 55. ―The term ‗pollution‘ means the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, 
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water.‖ Id. § 1362(19). It is not clear, from the 
legislative history or otherwise, whether Congress intended the apparent distinction between 
this definition of ―pollution‖ as applying to ―water‖ and the overall objective of the statute, 
which applies to the ―chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation‘s waters.‖ Id. 
§ 1251(a) (emphasis added).  
 56. See id. § 1288(b)(2)(F)–(H).  
 57. See, e.g., Lawrence P. Wilkins, The Implementation of Water Pollution Control 
Measures—Section 208 of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 15 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 479, 496 (1980).  
 58. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A) (2006).  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. § 1251(a)(1).  
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swimmable waters,
61
 but also its overriding objective of restoring and 
maintaining the integrity of the Nation‘s waters. The more specific 
management provisions mandated in section 319(b), however, revert 
to references to ―best management practices and measures . . . to 
reduce pollutant loadings‖ from each category of nonpoint sources.62 
Without meaning to mince words too finely, even the broader 
mission articulated for section 319 management plans is a 
grammatical oxymoron (―controlling pollution added from nonpoint 
sources‖).63 If ―pollution‖ is read in view of its statutory definition 
(―alteration‖ of ―chemical, physical, biological, and radiological 
integrity‖),64 it is difficult to see how nonpoint sources can ―add‖ an 
―alteration‖ of such integrity. Such fine textual interpretation aside, 
from a practical perspective it is clear that section 319 has been 
implemented, as was section 208, with a focus on the runoff of 
pollutants from nonpoint sources, and not as a tool to restore water 
bodies impaired by other kinds of physical and biological 
impairment.  
Despite these limitations in the language and structure of the 
CWA itself, however, over the past several decades there has been a 
significant proliferation of collaborative watershed-based programs, 
at a wide range of scales and using diverse institutions and methods, 
many of which aspire to restore water body integrity by addressing 
chemical, physical, and biological sources of impairment. Some of 
those efforts are conducted under water body-specific provisions of 
the Act, such as the Chesapeake Bay Program, the Great Lakes 
Program, and various efforts under the National Estuary Program.
65
 
The success of those programs has been mixed, and they have been 
both praised and critiqued as a result.
66
 Regardless of the merits of 
 
 61. Id. § 1251(a)(2). 
 62. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  
 63. Id. § 1329(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. § 1362(19). 
 65. See id. §§ 1267–1270 (water body-specific watershed programs), § 1330 (National 
Estuary Program).  
 66. See, e.g., Annecoos Wiersema, A Train without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law 
and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1281–1300 
(2008); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed 
Management in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 1059, 1059–60 
(2008); Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY 
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those efforts, however, they are not mandated by the CWA for all 
significant sources of aquatic ecosystem impairment in all impaired 
water bodies. A more systematic approach is needed if we are truly 
serious about restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation‘s waters and aquatic ecosystems. 
So what form might such an effort take, and what revisions to the 
CWA would be necessary to achieve it? It does not seem feasible or 
appropriate to emulate the operative provision of the CWA designed 
to control point source discharges of pollutants, the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (―NPDES‖)67 and its 
accompanying suite of technology-based effluent limitations.
68
 
Although the universe of point sources in the United States is 
extremely large,
69
 leading to major debates about the legally-
mandated scope of the program,
70
 it is at least finite compared to the 
full list of activities, structures, and human-induced conditions that 
contribute in some way to the ―man-made or man-induced alteration‖ 
of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of our waters. 
Taken to the extreme, that universe encompasses virtually every 
human activity. Thus, although it has been feasible, if difficult, to 
prohibit all point source discharges absent a permit imposing specific 
treatment requirements,
71
 an analogous solution for all sources of 
aquatic ecosystem degradation would be infeasible both politically 
and administratively.  
Instead, it would seem more appropriate to amend the water 
quality standards-driven components of the CWA, including the 
TMDL provisions in section 303(d) and the nonpoint source control 
provisions of section 319, to eliminate the latent ambiguity discussed 
above, i.e., to clarify that specific remedial measures must be 
undertaken to redress all violations of water quality standards, 
 
ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 379, 380–81 (2000); Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watersheds 
and the Integration of U.S. Water Law and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 2, 55–66 (2000).  
 67. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).  
 68. See id. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b).  
 69. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 775.  
 70. See, e.g., S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 104 
(2004); Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 71. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  
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whether numeric and pollutant-specific or biologically and 
ecologically based. Thus, when states are required to identify 
impaired water bodies for purposes of developing both TMDLs and 
nonpoint source management plans,
72
 they will clearly be required to 
include all impaired water bodies, regardless of the source. Section 
303(d) should be amended to clarify that remedial plans must include 
affirmative steps to either eliminate or to mitigate adverse effects 
from identifiable sources of impairment of water body integrity, 
either through watershed restoration efforts or by modifying adverse 
land uses and other activities. For example, if the absence of 
appropriate physical habitat and structure is a more significant 
impediment to restoring and maintaining a diverse, indigenous biota 
in a stream, the required restoration effort might be to restore the 
stream substrate, introduce woody debris into the system, and restore 
natural channel geometries,
73
 rather than to require additional 
controls on pollutant discharges. Although difficulties in ascertaining 
precise cause and effect might suggest an adaptive management 
approach to such efforts,
74
 uncertainty should not serve as an excuse 
for paralysis. Likewise, section 319 can be amended to clarify that 
nonpoint source management plans and controls should include 
efforts to reduce, mitigate, or eliminate the effects of all forms of 
nonpoint source pollution, and not just runoff of pollutants from 
nonpoint sources.
75
  
The traditional objection to imposing CWA requirements on a 
broader range of economic activities is the specter of federal intrusion 
into land use and economic policies that, from a federalism 
 
 72. In the next Part, I make the independent argument that section 319 should be 
strengthened to make controls developed under that provision mandatory and enforceable.  
 73. See, e.g., Menninger & Palmer, supra note 40, at 95.  
 74. Adaptive management is the process by which managers of ecosystem restoration or 
management programs ―learn by doing‖ through a considered process of developing and testing 
hypotheses about the responses of the ecosystem to various restoration or management efforts, 
and revising the process iteratively based on the knowledge gained. See generally Carl J. 
Walters & C.S. Holling, Large-Scale Management Experiments and Learning by Doing, 71 
ECOLOGY 2060 (1990); KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993).  
 75. Actually, it would be even better to eliminate the considerable duplication in planning 
and management efforts reflected in sections 208, 303, 304(l), and 319 of the CWA, and to 
merge them into a single, integrated planning and remediation provision. Those structural 
improvements in the CWA, however, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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perspective, are viewed as more appropriate for state and local 
regulation. By leaving these issues firmly in state control via the 
section 303(d) and 319 planning mechanisms, such extensive federal 
intervention should be avoided. However, it is reasonable to predict 
that progress will remain elusive if EPA lacks the authority to review 
and approve the proposed remedial measures, and to hold states 
accountable for attainment and maintenance of all forms of water 
quality standards through restoration or other efforts.
76
 Some 
reasonable balance is needed between respecting state and local 
prerogatives and providing accountability for CWA implementation. 
States should have a strong incentive, however, to embrace water 
body restoration approaches to CWA implementation. Restoring 
riparian wetlands and other riparian habitats might significantly 
reduce costs of storm water management and treatment. Restoring 
natural stream morphology and bank integrity might resolve 
sedimentation and other problems and therefore reduce or eliminate 
treatment costs from other sources. As noted above, systems that 
possess conditions closer to natural ecosystem structure and function 
are more resilient, or able to withstand other stressors without 
adverse effects. In short, restoration approaches are investments that 
not only will help to achieve the goals of the CWA, but might save 
other pollution control costs that are less effective and potentially 
unnecessary.  
A second major objection is likely to be money. Aquatic 
ecosystem restoration efforts are often extremely expensive. Of 
course, where significant impairments are caused by private 
economic activities, which are nonpoint rather than point source in 
nature, there seems to be no reason why those sources should not be 
required to internalize the costs of reducing or eliminating those 
impacts in the same way as point sources are required to obtain the 
requisite NPDES permits and to install the necessary pollution 
control technology. Where impacts are caused by a more diffuse 
range of sources or by ―legacy‖ sources of pollution for which no 
 
 76. Cf. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans—
Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 357–65 (2004) 
(critiquing accountability problems in the analogous Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan 
(―SIP‖) process).  
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current responsible parties can be identified, or where the problems 
are public or generic in nature, restoration costs will have to be borne 
by the public at large. If significant public restoration costs are 
imposed through an amended CWA, states likely will protest them as 
―unfunded federal mandates.‖ Whether or not those objections are 
valid theoretically,
77
 they are very real politically.  
Given the massive federal investment in public point source 
pollution controls during the 1970s and 1980s through the CWA‘s 
Title II construction grants program, and the realization that so many 
water bodies remain significantly impaired despite those investments, 
it is appropriate to propose a ―restoration grants‖ program of similar 
magnitude. Environmental restoration creates jobs and addresses 
significant environmental needs. Therefore, such a program might 
receive support for its economic stimulus as well as its environmental 
value.  
III. EXPANDING THE TOOLS (PART II): FROM AN INDUSTRIAL TO A 
POST-INDUSTRIAL AGE  
The historical weakness of nonpoint source pollution control 
cannot be explained by the claim that, in 1972, Congress adopted 
much stricter controls on industrial and municipal point sources than 
on nonpoint sources because it was less fully aware of the latter 
problem.
78
 On the contrary, when Congress enacted the 1972 
Amendments it was quite well aware of the problem of nonpoint 
source pollution. The 1972 Senate Report explained:  
 One of the most significant aspects of this year‘s hearings 
on the pending legislation was the information presented on 
the degree to which nonpoint sources contribute to water 
pollution. Agricultural runoff, animal wastes, soil erosion, 
fertilizers, pesticides and other farm chemicals that are a part 
of runoff, construction runoff and siltation from mines and acid 
mine drainage are major contributors to the Nation‘s water 
 
 77. See Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Federal Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 
50 VAND. L. REV. 1137 passim (1997). 
 78. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 44, at 172–73. 
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pollution problem. Little has been done to control this major 
source of pollution.  
 It has become clearly established that the waters of the 
Nation cannot be restored and their quality maintained unless 
the very complex and difficult problem of nonpoint sources is 
addressed.
79
  
Despite this awareness of the relative severity of the nonpoint 
source pollution problem discussed above, Congress adopted 
solutions for those problems with notably duller teeth than for major 
industrial and municipal sources. In essence, although Congress 
realized that runoff from agriculture and a wide range of other land 
uses was at least equally responsible for the nation‘s epidemic of 
water pollution, it focused its efforts on the most obvious and most 
readily redressed sources of pollution from factories and large 
municipal treatment plants. The law aimed at industrial sources in an 
industrial age. The initial strategy can be defended or at least 
explained, however, on several grounds. We knew far more about 
how to treat pollutants from major point sources, and engineers could 
develop even better control methods based on available or readily 
obtained information and technology. Imposing strict, uniform 
federal controls on factories was more politically defensible than 
federal efforts aimed at state and local land use policies, and major 
industries were a more acceptable target politically than tens of 
thousands of farmers, developers, or other small businesses. Congress 
believed—or at least articulated the view—that states and localities 
were better suited to address land use and other nonpoint source 
pollution problems that varied widely with different local geography, 
climate, topography, economies, and other factors, and for which 
more finely tuned solutions were appropriate.
80
  
Ironically, just a year after Congress adopted the 1972 Act, Daniel 
Bell published his prophetic book The Coming of Post-Industrial 
Society, in which he predicted a shift from manufacturing to service 
industries, from blue collar to professional employment, from labor-
dominated to information- and technology-based economies, and 
 
 79. S. REP. NO. 92-414, (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3668, 3705.  
 80. See id. at 3703–06; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006).  
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from rural to urban and suburban residence.
81
 That set of predictions, 
of course, has been remarkably accurate and has significant 
implications for the CWA and other environmental laws and policies. 
Since 1972, the United States has continued its massive migration to 
urban and suburban areas, and sprawl
82
 now threatens the integrity of 
our waterways as much or more than industrial discharges did in the 
1960s. High-tech and information-based businesses increasingly 
dominate the economy,
83
 and while they typically do not spew 
massive volumes of pollutants into our waters in the same way as 
steel mills and chemical plants once did, they contribute to sprawl 
and massive building booms, with significant environmental 
implications.  
To avoid overstating the case, manufacturing and other industries 
clearly continue to contribute significantly to the U.S. economy and 
to its environmental problems as well. It would be a mistake to lower 
our guard by retreating from implementation and enforcement of the 
key point source control provisions of the CWA, which have 
succeeded in reducing, but not yet eliminating, threats from 
discharges of toxic and other pollutants into the Nation‘s waters.  
At the same time, however, we have not been nearly so successful 
at reducing the impacts of either the kinds of nonpoint source 
pollution identified in the 1972 legislative history and legislation 
(agriculture, silviculture, mining, construction, etc.), or the 
increasingly-predominant effects of urbanization and suburbanization 
(sprawl) that have radically altered the hydrology and other 
characteristics of so many watersheds around the country. Rivers and 
streams in urbanized areas exhibit serious ecological changes due to 
the impacts of urbanization on water quality and temperature; runoff 
timing and volumes; river and stream profiles; sediment flow and 
streambed composition and morphology; riparian vegetation; and 
 
 81. DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL 
FORECASTING (1973).  
 82. See generally Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Introduction: Integrating Water 
Controls and Land Use Controls: New Ideas and Old Obstacles, in WET GROWTH, supra note 
47, at 1, 3–7.  
 83. See ROSS C. DEVOL ET AL., MILKEN INST., NORTH AMERICA‘S HIGH-TECH 
ECONOMY: THE GEOGRAPHY OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED INDUSTRIES 11 (2009). 
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other physical, chemical, and hydrological characteristics.
84
 
Hydrologic changes in urbanized areas may pose more substantial 
barriers to aquatic ecosystem restoration than chemical pollution.
85
 
Likewise, runoff from agriculture and other categories of nonpoint 
sources that Congress recognized in the 1972 law remains the largest 
source of pollutants that continue to contaminate the Nation‘s 
waters.
86
  
The real challenge, then, is to adapt a law written primarily to 
address industrial water pollution into one that addresses the more 
subtle but ubiquitous problems of a post-industrial age.
87
 For the most 
part, despite three and a half decades of efforts, first under section 
208 and later under section 319, nonpoint sources of pollution remain 
subject to a patchwork of state and local control programs, many of 
which are voluntary or poorly enforced. Although comprehensive 
watershed approaches are the logical approach to ensuring that the 
full range of impairments are identified and addressed within 
individual watersheds, even the best watershed programs will remain 
limited if the tools to address many of the leading sources of harm 
remain dull.
88
  
The irony of the CWA is that when the 1972 law was enacted, 
Congress chose the strictest regulatory approaches for what appeared 
 
 84. See, e.g., Larry R. Brown et al., Introduction to Effects of Urbanization on Stream 
Ecosystems, 47 AM. FISHERIES SOC‘Y SYMPOSIUM 1, 1–2 (2005); U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
U.S. DEP‘T OF THE INTERIOR, EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION ON STREAM ECOSYSTEMS FS-042-02 
(2002); JAMES F. COLES ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PROFESSIONAL PAPER 
1695, THE EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION ON THE BIOLOGICAL, PHYSICAL, AND CHEMICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF COASTAL NEW ENGLAND STREAMS (2004); Faith A. Fitzpatrick et al., 
Urbanization Influences on Aquatic Communities in Northeastern Illinois Streams, 2004 J. AM. 
WATER RES. ASS‘N 461 passim (2004); LORI A. SPRAGUE, ROBERT E. ZUELLIG & JEAN A. 
DUPREE, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE INTERIOR, EFFECTS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT ON STREAM 
ECOSYSTEMS ALONG THE FRONT RANGE OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS, COLORADO AND 
WYOMING FS 2006-3083 (2006). 
 85. For a discussion of hydrologic changes in urban areas, see Christopher P. Konrad & 
Derek B. Booth, Hydrologic Changes in Urban Streams and Their Ecological Significance, 47 
AM. FISHERIES SOC‘Y SYMPOSIUM 157 passim (2005). 
 86. See Andreen, supra note 11, at 564.  
 87. From a temporal perspective, of course, agricultural runoff could be viewed as pre-
industrial rather than post-industrial. The nature of the problem, however, is the same. The key 
tools in the CWA to address industrial (and municipal) pollution do not apply in the same way 
to either urban or agricultural nonpoint source pollution.  
 88. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
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to be the most acute sources of harm—strict, mandatory, and 
enforceable permitting and treatment obligations for large municipal 
and industrial point sources
89—while choosing more flexible 
approaches for non-industrial sources of pollution. The approach was 
designed in and for an industrial society, during which industrial 
sources of pollution were viewed as the most severe. However 
appropriate that dichotomy may have been at the time, it no longer 
serves the purposes of the Act in an increasingly post-industrial 
society, when at least the most severe pollution from industrial 
sources has been curtailed, and in which other economic and land use 
forces now pose the most serious barriers to attainment of the goals 
of the CWA. 
As I have written elsewhere,
90
 the best way to close the gap 
between industrial and non-industrial pollution sources is to adopt a 
mandatory system of enforceable ―best practice‖ standards for 
polluted runoff and other kinds of nonpoint source pollution 
analogous but not identical to the system of mandatory, technology-
based controls on municipal and industrial point sources. Those 
standards cannot logically aspire to the same degree of uniformity as 
secondary treatment requirements for municipal sewage discharges or 
as effluent limitations for similarly designed and operated facilities 
within properly defined classes and categories of industrial point 
sources. Rather, such standards should be sufficiently flexible to 
account for differences in climate, soils, topography, land uses, 
economics, and other factors. The inherent variability in conditions 
affecting nonpoint source pollution, however, is not a sufficient 
reason to address this major source of pollution with less force than 
we have for industrial sources. Future strategies for water pollution 
control now must be tailored to the problems and realities of a post-
industrial society.  
 
 89. In terms of the nature of the pollution and the kinds of control strategies that are best 
suited to addressing them, municipal sewage treatment plants fit more appropriately into the 
―industrial‖ category, particularly given the fact that many industrial sources discharge into 
municipal treatment systems and are regulated by the CWA pretreatment program. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1317(b) (2006).  
 90. See Robert W. Adler, Water Quality and Agriculture: Assessing Alternative Futures, 
25 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y J. 77, 85–87 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of the CWA 163 
 
 
IV. EXPANDING THE SCOPE: FROM NAVIGABLE TO SUSTAINABLE 
WATERS  
When Congress adopted the 1972 amendments to the CWA, it 
clearly recognized that the traditional focus on nineteenth century 
concepts of navigability in earlier federal water pollution control 
legislation was unduly narrow. The 1972 legislative history reflects 
that Congress understood that water flows in hydrologic cycles, and 
that there is a clear relationship between upstream sources and 
downstream water quality and aquatic ecosystem health.
91
 As such, 
Congress noted that it intended to expand the statutory scope to the 
limits permissible under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.
92
  
However (and in my view, unfortunately), rather than replacing 
the term ―navigable waters‖ with something more expansive, 
Congress chose to expand the jurisdictional reach of the law by 
defining ―navigable waters‖ as the ―waters of the United States.‖93 As 
a result, for many decades EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers have struggled to find a workable theory of CWA 
jurisdiction consistent with the statutory text and the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.
94
 While Congress likely did not intend the 
meaning to be limited to navigable water, the Supreme Court 
ultimately seized on Congress‘s continued use of the term ―navigable 
waters‖ to limit the jurisdictional scope of the statute to those waters 
that are, at least in some way, linked to waters subject to the 
traditional tests of navigability.
95
 That limitation generated yet 
another series of legal disputes about the jurisdictional reach of the 
 
 91. See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742–43.  
 92. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 (1972); Kim Diana Connolly, Any Hope for Happily 
Ever After? Reflections on Rapanos and the Future of the Clean Water Act Section 404 
Program, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 40, 48–49 (L. 
Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007).  
 93. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).  
 94. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC‘S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 110–48 (2d 
ed. 2009).  
 95. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
167–68 (2001). For the traditional tests of navigability in different contexts, see United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 380 (1940), and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 
563–64 (1870).  
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statute.
96
 Later still, the Supreme Court issued a widely split set of 
opinions on how this required linkage to navigable waters should be 
interpreted with respect to different water bodies based on the degree 
to which they are ―adjacent to‖ navigable waters.97 Once again, that 
decision has generated disputes and confusion in the lower courts 
about the jurisdictional reach of the CWA.
98
  
Bills have been introduced in Congress to clarify the scope of the 
CWA in ways that are not so strictly limited to the protection of 
navigable waters.
99
 That legislation properly recognizes that the 
federal interest in water quality and aquatic ecosystem integrity 
extends far beyond the nineteenth century interest of expanding and 
maintaining the safety of navigable waters for purposes of commerce, 
and that those interests are well within the reach of congressional 
authority under the Constitution, including but not limited to the 
Commerce Clause. What has been missing from the debate, perhaps, 
is a more comprehensive theory of, and effort to articulate the nature 
of, that federal interest. Moreover, since 1972 we have improved and 
expanded our scientific understanding of the inextricable linkages 
among various components of the aquatic ecosystem, and of the fact 
that no components of those systems are ―isolated‖ from a hydrologic 
or ecological perspective.
100
  
Water is fundamental to national economic sustainability in ways 
that extend far beyond the concept of navigability, and the evolving 
 
 96. Compare, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 710–11 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 541 U.S. 972 (2004) (reading SWANCC narrowly and finding CWA jurisdiction over all 
waters with a hydrological connection to navigable waters), with In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 
345–46 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding CWA jurisdiction over only navigable waters and water bodies 
immediately adjacent thereto).  
 97. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 717, 788, 808, 811 (2006).  
 98. Compare, e.g., N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (finding CWA jurisdiction based on Justice Kennedy‘s ―significant nexus‖ test), with 
United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 615 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting 
CWA jurisdiction absent clear connection between oil spill and navigable water).  
 99. See Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 2421, 110th Cong. § 4 (1st Sess. 
2007) (drafted ―to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify the jurisdiction of 
the United States over waters of the United States‖). On June 18, 2009, the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works approved and reported a version of this bill introduced by 
Senator Russell Feingold (D. Wis.), S. 787, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.00787.  
 100. See, e.g., PATRICK COMER ET AL., NATURESERVE, BIODIVERSITY VALUES OF 
GEOGRAPHICALLY ISOLATED WETLANDS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2005).  
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concept of sustainability could serve as a unifying principle for CWA 
jurisdiction fully consistent with constitutional limits. Aside from air, 
water is the natural resource most fundamental to human existence. 
Every business in the country, from local shops to major industries, 
uses and relies heavily if not essentially on water on a daily basis. 
Irrigation water is essential to grow food and other crops traded 
nationally and internationally. In manufacturing, water is used as a 
raw ingredient for countless goods, and serves cleaning, processing, 
cooling, and other functions for others. In the natural world, water 
moves through a global hydrological cycle whose atmospheric, 
surface water, and ground water movements respect no geopolitical 
boundaries. Economically, water is bought and sold across state and 
international lines, and is the subject of interstate compacts and 
international treaties.
101
 As a result, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
ground water is a commodity,
102
 and has also held that navigable 
waters, their tributaries, and upstream sources that affect those waters 
are channels of commerce, for purposes of federal Commerce Clause 
authority.
103
 Interstate and international water disputes have even led 
to war,
104
 and others have noted the relationship between water and 
terrorism,
105
 suggesting that the federal interest in protecting water 
 
 101. See, e.g., Colorado River Compact, UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-12a-2 (1953) (distributing 
water originating from the Colorado River Basin among seven western states); Delaware River 
Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961) (establishing a water resource agency 
to govern water distribution in Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania); Treaty on 
the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., 
Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 (allocating water from the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande 
Rivers); Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters 
between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (setting 
water distribution among lakes and rivers that form the international border between the United 
States and Canada). See generally SHLOMI DINAR, INTERNATIONAL WATER TREATIES: 
NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION ALONG TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS (2008) (studying 
transboundary environmental problems). 
 102. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54 (1982).  
 103. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 380 (1940); The Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 565–66 (1870). 
 104. See Mark F. Giordano, Meredith A. Giordano & Aaron T. Wolf, International 
Resource Conflict and Mitigation, 42 J. PEACE RES. 47, 47–48 (2005) (noting conflict among 
the ten countries sharing resources from the Nile basin); Peter H. Gleick, Environment and 
Security: Water Conflict Chronology Version 2006–2007, in THE WORLD‘S WATER 2006–
2007: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 189 (Peter H. Gleick ed., 2006) 
[hereinafter THE WORLD‘S WATER].  
 105. See Peter H. Gleick, Water and Terrorism, in THE WORLD‘S WATER, supra note 104, 
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resources has national defense and foreign policy implications as 
well. For similar reasons, I propose elsewhere that the historically 
limited federal role in water resource law and policy (as opposed to 
water pollution control law and policy) should be reconsidered as 
well,
106
 and that we need to bridge the current artificial divisions 
between laws and policies designed to address water quality and 
those designed to address water quantity, between surface water and 
ground water, and between water law and land use policy.
107
  
Therefore, although Congress in 1972 clearly recognized the value 
of water and water bodies for many uses beyond navigation, and the 
need to protect waters for those diverse uses,
108
 the time has come to 
amend the law in ways that more expressly articulate the use and 
value of water and aquatic ecosystems. The evolving concept of 
―sustainability‖109 provides a useful rubric for that expanded basis for 
the comprehensive approach to water pollution control possible 
through application of the CWA to all U.S. surface waters, without 
regard to artificial notions of adjacency to navigable waters. So long 
as the concept of sustainable waters is linked appropriately to 
national economic welfare and security, as is clearly true, that 
expanded focus of the Act is well within Congress‘s constitutional 
authority. Moreover, that broader concept also suggests a better 
integration of water quality and aquatic ecosystem restoration and 
protection with water resources management, as the Supreme Court 
has already indicated is appropriate to some degree, even given the 
current focus of the law.
110
  
This focus on the comprehensive sustainability of waters and 
water bodies, however, highlights one of the most perplexing 
paradoxes inherent in the CWA as currently interpreted and 
implemented: the dramatic distinction between the level and nature of 
 
at 1.  
 106. See Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2010).  
 107. See Robert W. Adler, Institutions Affecting the Urban Water Environment, in THE 
WATER ENVIRONMENT OF CITIES 212–13 (Lawrence A. Baker ed., 2009). 
 108. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c), 1314(a) (2006).  
 109. See generally AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA (John C. Dernbach ed., 2009).  
 110. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep‘t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 
(1994).  
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protection afforded to waters under section 402 and section 404 of 
the CWA. Under the former, protection is strict and based largely on 
concepts of prevention. Under the latter, at least in practice, 
protection is comparatively weak and based more on principles of 
mitigation than prevention.  
The distinction is highlighted dramatically—and disturbingly—by 
a case decided by the United States Supreme Court at the very end of 
the 2008–2009 term.111 The case involved a pristine Alaskan lake 
adjacent to a large proposed mining operation, into which the mine 
operator proposed to discharge tremendous volumes of mine tailings 
and other wastes. Section 301(a) of the Act flatly prohibits such 
discharges absent a valid permit and compliance with the terms and 
restrictions of that permit.
112
 If governed by section 402, the 
discharge would be prohibited entirely under applicable EPA effluent 
limitations for this category of gold mining operation, in favor of 
upland disposal of the waste material.
113
 That result would be 
consistent with one of the key goals of the Act, to eliminate the 
discharge of pollutants into the nation‘s waters wherever feasible.114 
Even if a technology-based effluent limitation allowed some 
discharges, however, stricter water quality-based effluent limitations 
would be required to ensure attainment of applicable state water 
quality standards.
115
 Those water quality standards, in turn, mandate 
the protection of water quality and other conditions necessary, 
wherever attainable, to provide for ―protection and propagation of 
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and . . . recreation in and on the water.‖116  
Instead of meeting those strict requirements, however, the 
applicant sought and obtained a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers under section 404 of the Act rather than from EPA under 
section 402. That permit allowed unlimited discharges of waste 
material in a manner that would destroy the entire biota of the lake 
 
 111. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009).  
 112. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  
 113. See New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), 40 C.F.R. § 440.104 (2008).  
 114. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1311(b)(2)(A), 1316(a)(1) (2006). 
 115. See id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312.  
 116. Id. § 1251(a)(2).  
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for some twenty years, with only a promise of restoration after 
mining operations and discharges cease.
117
  
In the review of this case by the Supreme Court, my colleague 
Professor Amy Wildermuth and I (along with the respondents and 
other amici curiae) argued that section 404 does not properly apply to 
this kind of discharge, and urged the Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit 
ruling.
118
 In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, however,
119
 the 
Supreme Court upheld this perverse result by upholding the Corps‘s 
interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions as conferring 
authority on the Corps to issue the permits in question,
120
 which in 
turn, the Court ruled, divested EPA of the authority to do so.
121
 That 
holding, in my view, has the matter entirely backwards. In section 
402, Congress granted EPA (or states delegated authority to 
administer the NPDES program
122
) the primary authority to issue 
permits for discharges of pollutants under the Act, and in section 404, 
Congress delegated to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers the 
authority to issue permits only for a narrowly defined category of 
pollutants (―dredged or fill material . . . at specified disposal 
sites‖123). Given that the discharge in question constituted industrial 
wastes subject to EPA‘s categorical effluent limitations for this 
category of facility, the limited exception in section 404 did not 
apply. Justice Kennedy‘s opinion, therefore, turned the exception into 
the rule as applied to this case.  
 
 117. This result was prevented initially when, at least pending Supreme Court review on 
Petition for Certiorari, the permit was vacated and remanded by a panel of the Ninth Circuit. Se. 
Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 479 F.3d 1148, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 
2007).  
 118. Brief for the Honorable G. Tracy Meehan, III, Former Assistant Adm‘r for Water at 
the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14, Coeur Alaska, 
Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council (Nos. 07-984 and 07-990). I note this involvement in 
part to disclose my obvious bias in this matter.  
 119. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and by Justices Thomas, 
Breyer, and Alito, and in part by Justice Scalia, who concurred in part and concurred in the 
result in part. A dissent written by Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter.  
 120. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2469–
2477 (2009). In my view, Justice Kennedy‘s deference to an agency interpretation that had not 
been reflected in any prior formal agency decision was misplaced as a matter of administrative 
law, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 121. See id. at 2467.  
 122. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006).  
 123. Id. § 1344(a).  
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However, the Coeur Alaska case and the history of section 404 
implementation generally suggest a much more troubling question. 
For those cases in which section 404 does properly apply to a 
discharge, why are some waters allowed to be destroyed (or ―filled‖) 
entirely, while discharges permitted under section 402 require 
absolute protection via either strict technology-based controls (with a 
goal of zero discharge wherever technologically and economically 
feasible) or through absolute attainment of applicable water quality 
standards adequate to protect all existing and designated water body 
uses?
124
 Indeed, how can permits allowing dischargers to destroy 
entire wetlands or other water bodies, or at least significant portions 
thereof, be reconciled with the underlying statutory goal to ―restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation‘s waters‖?125  
The regulations promulgated by EPA under section 404(b) of the 
Act theoretically prohibit discharges under section 404 if there is any 
practicable alternative with less damaging effects to the waters of the 
United States,
126
 and EPA retains the authority to veto any Corps-
issued permit that it deems might have an ―unacceptable adverse 
effect‖ on various listed resources.127 Moreover, applicants for a 
section 404 permit must seek certification from the state in which the 
discharge occurs that the discharge will comply with state water 
quality standards,
128
 presumably including the obligations to protect 
existing and designated water body uses
129
 and antidegradation 
requirements.
130
 In practice, however, the Corps grants the vast 
majority of the permits requested under section 404; states rarely 
object to those permits under section 401, even where a wetland area 
is destroyed entirely; and EPA has used its section 404(c) veto 
authority in only a small handful of cases.
131
 Thus, in most cases in 
 
 124. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10, 131.12 (2009).  
 125. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  
 126. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2009); Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Transp., 
305 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2002), modified on other grounds, 319 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 
2003).  
 127. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006).  
 128. See id. § 1341.  
 129. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (2009).  
 130. Id. § 131.12.  
 131. See Adler, supra note 16, at 69.  
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which an applicant seeks permission to discharge dredged or fill 
material into a water of the United States, the result is that all or a 
portion of the target water body is eliminated entirely, not just 
degraded to some degree deemed permissible by the permitting 
authority based on water quality standards and other factors.  
One possible explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that 
many permits sought and issued under section 404 allow discharges 
into wetlands on private property for purposes of development, 
whereas most section 402 permits authorize discharges of pollutants 
into public waters. Permit denials under section 404 thus risk the 
possibility of constitutional takings challenges under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
132
 However, if otherwise 
subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA, or if a river or stream flows 
through private property, NPDES permits are subject to the same 
strict requirements as apply to other waters. A landowner can no 
more destroy a water of the United States running through private 
property with industrial discharges than it could any other water 
body.  
A second possible explanation is that under the applicable section 
404 regulations, parties granted permission to fill wetlands must both 
minimize the resulting harm and mitigate that harm by restoring 
wetlands with equivalent functions and values elsewhere, preferably 
within the same watershed and as proximate to the areas destroyed or 
degraded as possible.
133
 In that sense, one might argue that the values 
and functions of specific wetlands are simply being displaced rather 
than eliminated entirely. However, considerable uncertainty remains 
about the efficacy of wetlands restoration, and many ―restored‖ or 
―created‖ wetlands do not replace the actual functions and values of 
the wetlands that were destroyed.
134
 Moreover, damage caused 
through discharges permitted under section 402 is not permitted 
simply because other similar areas are restored, i.e., an industrial 
discharger cannot destroy or significantly degrade a stream so long as 
 
 132. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  
 133. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.10(d), 230.70–230.77 (2009). 
 134. See THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICES, STATUS AND TRENDS OF 
WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1998 TO 2004, 15–17 (2006).  
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she compensates for that loss by restoring another stream in a nearby 
location.  
A third possible explanation, perhaps the most plausible, is that 
the diametrically opposite standards applicable to section 402 permits 
and to section 404 permits resulted from an historical accident, and 
hence received little or no attention from Congress. After all, it was 
only after being sued by environmental groups that the Corps of 
Engineers began to use section 404 to permit discharges into 
wetlands, as opposed to open bodies of water.
135
 As Professor 
Allyson Flournoy has aptly noted,
136
 the Corps‘s use of permits for 
discharge into wetlands has resulted in the use of this permitting tool, 
designed largely to control the discharge of pollutants, in deciding 
either to protect wetland habitats as a resource conservation goal or to 
allow landowners to develop their property.  
Once again, refocusing the section 404 program from one that 
protects navigable waters (and navigability) to one that protects the 
sustainability of aquatic ecosystems may make more sense. Decades 
of litigation—with no apparent end in sight—show that the 
navigability rubric makes no sense when addressing the ecological 
significance of ―water‖ bodies whose hydrological and ecological 
transition from dry land to open water ―is not necessarily or even 
typically an abrupt one.‖137 Revising this aspect of the CWA will no 
doubt be fraught with peril both for landowners and for 
environmentalists seeking greater protection. After all these years, 
however, perhaps we have been asking the wrong question. Rather 
than asking when it is permissible to discharge dredged and fill 
material into wetlands, maybe we should be asking which wetlands 
must be protected in order to restore and maintain the overall 
integrity of watersheds within an area, as part of a comprehensive 
effort to restore and maintain the ecological sustainability of those 
 
 135. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding 
Army Corps of Engineers without authority to alter Congress‘s definition of ―navigable 
waters‖).  
 136. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A Program in Search of a 
Policy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 607, 618–20 (2004) (noting the problem of using a pollution control 
permitting tool for habitat protection).  
 137. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).  
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systems and the ecological functions they perform and services they 
provide.  
CONCLUSION  
The last truly significant revisions to federal water pollution 
legislation, at least in terms of overall approach, occurred in 1972, 
almost forty years ago. True, Congress adopted lengthy and complex 
amendments to the CWA in 1977 and 1987, and more targeted 
amendments in other years, but all of those revisions added or 
changed details, not the basic philosophies and implementing 
methods reflected in the law.  
As far as it goes, the CWA has been among the nation‘s more 
successful environmental statutes. Where implementation tools have 
matched the statutory objectives, especially with respect to control of 
point source discharges of pollutants into surface waters, the law has 
resulted in significant progress in improving the quality of the 
Nation‘s waters. However, when viewed from the broader statutory 
objective to ―restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation‘s waters,‖138 the statutory tools are 
either too dull to accomplish the task, or in some cases the 
appropriate tools have yet to be forged at all. We have focused far 
more on maintenance than on restoration, and we have focused on 
chemical integrity to the virtual exclusion of physical and biological 
integrity. In some cases, especially but not exclusively in the context 
of the discharges to wetlands, we have sanctioned the complete 
destruction of many waters of the United States.  
To some degree, this disconnect may have resulted from the fact 
that, while articulating a broader set of ecological goals for the future 
of the Nation‘s waters, the more specific problems Congress 
addressed in 1972 from an operative perspective were those of 
industrial pollution in an industrial age. The CWA‘s permitting 
programs, effluent limitations, and water quality standards were 
focused specifically on those problems, and only more generally on 
the statute‘s broader objectives. Perhaps that narrower focus was 
appropriate in 1972; conversely, perhaps a broader operative focus 
 
 138. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  
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would have spread resources too thin to accomplish what we have to 
date. That largely rhetorical and probably unanswerable question 
aside, however, the more pertinent question for the future is how to 
retool the CWA to address those statutory goals that have received 
relatively less attention, and to focus on the prevailing threats to the 
health and integrity of aquatic ecosystems in a post-industrial world.  
In this Article, I have argued that the focus of the CWA should be 
modified or expanded in four ways if we are to realize the ambitious 
but entirely appropriate objectives Congress articulated in 1972. First, 
in refining the statutory target of ―chemical, physical and biological 
integrity,‖ we need to make better use of current concepts of 
ecosystem resilience rather than the notion of ecosystem ―stability‖ 
that prevailed when the 1972 law was passed. Second, while 
continuing to ensure that the health of aquatic ecosystems is not 
further degraded, we need to develop the statutory and other tools 
necessary to press forward with the restoration goal of the statute. 
Third, we need to pursue the long-recognized statutory gap in 
redressing non-industrial forms of water pollution from a much wider 
range of sources than traditional industrial and municipal point 
source discharges. Finally, we need to revise our definitions and 
overall notions of ―waters‖ and ―waters of the United States‖ to focus 
on the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems for human and natural 
uses, rather than on the antiquated concept of navigability. The 
details of each of those projects, of course, will require considerably 
more fine-tuned analysis than is possible in this brief Article.  
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